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PREFACE and ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS 
 The questions of narrative, free will, and volition have undoubtedly been 
around for many ages, dating even prior to the empirical method that we 
prescribe to modern science. In the modern day, this question that should be 
approached by all sides and all methods has sadly turned into an arguing point 
on the limitations of various approaches, leaving different fields staking claim on 
the question itself and disregarding the other approaches available. This problem 
of claim has seemingly been happening most frequently between the humanities 
and the sciences – in particular, the fields of neuroscience and of linguistics and 
the genre of fiction. Although the fields of neuroscience and humanities approach 
questions regarding the role of narrative in our lives and the role of our lives in 
narrative with very different strategies, I assert that when the two conclusions are 
fleshed out and put into conversation with each other, the results are nonetheless 
the same: feedback loops abundant, filled with the intricacies of both top-down 
and bottom-up interplay, all the while implying ethical imperative.  
 I would like to thank my advisor, Dr. Mark Bruhn, my reader, Dr. Brian 
Drwecki, as well as Dr. Tom Howe, Martin Garnar, and the entire Regis Honors 
community for the continued help and support that they provided throughout this 
entire project.  
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INTRODUCTION 
 
 Ever since I picked up my first simple pop neuroscientific text, I have been 
utterly fascinated with the notions of free-will, physiology, and reductionism. 
Throughout high school all I wanted to read, and nothing more, was 
neuroscientific and philosophical texts on how people are situated in terms of 
their reality and their brain. Early on, I was entirely convinced that the only option 
there was, in the terms of free-will, was deterministic reductionism, resulting in 
the mere notion of free-will being almost laughable and incomprehensible to me. 
Reading texts from only overly closed off neuroscientists definitely led to my 
mindset for the years to come. Because of my fascination with our seeming lack 
of free-will, I decided that I would love to be able to add on to the data that is 
already present. This, in essence, was the entire reason I found myself within the 
neuroscience program at Regis.  
 Though there was originally only fascination, there was also a sense of 
urgency in this realm for a few different reasons. Firstly, I felt the need to attempt 
to take away the stigma within the idea that we lack the option to choose. 
Throughout high school even attempting to talk to people about the subject, or 
just mentioning the mere notion, would result in people immediately walking 
away or just laughing at the thought. Secondly, I felt the need to attempt to 
approach the implications that come in the realm of justice, if we are to seriously 
accept that we lack any sort of free-will. The first question that must be asked if 
one is making the claim that we lack free-will is certainly how ought we to be 
responsible (if we can) in any way for our actions. Following that, we have to ask 
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what forms of justice we can implement in order to address ethical issues while 
still recognizing the lack of choice. After majoring in neuroscience and moving 
onto the second question, I was pushed into the realm of philosophy.  
 Though I was convinced that a common neuroscientific view on the topic 
of free-will (overly deterministic reductionism) was comprehensive enough to 
explain free-will (or a lack thereof), I was pushed to major in philosophy by an 
urge to understand the differing views on the subject. These texts brought up 
multiple points that made me start to doubt completely all of the ideas that 
brought me to the Regis neuroscience program in general. Some of these ideas 
were things such as emergence, the implications of being within a narrative, 
phenomenological explorations and explanations, and even just the urgency with 
which writers/philosophers approach the question itself.  
 Even though these texts have obviously not resolved my curiosity around 
the subject, they have naturally opened the question itself. More specifically, 
David Foster Wallace’s The Broom of the System has pushed me into the realm 
of linguistics, narrative, and the notion of the individual being a construct within 
someone else’s narrative. This thesis is a sort of culmination of mine and others’ 
thoughts around the subjects at hand, both meant to help clarify and explore 
notions that are touched upon, in my opinion, far less often than they should be. 
Therefore, this thesis aims to do a few things: 1) Adequately and fairly bring in 
viewpoints from across the spectrum of multiple fields. 2) Showcase the 
fruitfulness of bringing in fields that are normally seen as dichotomous on the 
subject at hand. 3) Walk away with not an answer, but a more well informed 
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viewpoint on the subject, leaving me more conscious of the implications of my 
actions upon this world. 4) Finish with a question worth following up on after the 
“conclusion” of my thesis.  
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The Roles of the Constituents 
 
The Role of a Neuron in a Narrative 
 Back in the early 1960’s, 
neuroscience graduate student Michael 
Gazzaniga met a man at California 
Institute of Technology who opened an 
opportunity to a once in a lifetime 
chance for research. This man that 
walked in, W.J., was the recipient of a 
corpus callosotomy, a treatment that 
severs the nerve fibers between the 
hemispheres of your brain in order to 
hinder the spread of epileptic seizures, 
all the while confining information 
hemispherically in the brain – leaving 
one hemisphere unable to communicate 
with the other half. When words or 
letters were flashed to the right 
hemisphere, W.J. claimed that he didn’t 
see anything while still remaining able to 
mark and signify what he saw with his 
left hand via telegraph key – a key that 
 
The Role of a Word in a Narrative 
 Wittgenstein in his works 
Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus and 
the Philosophical Investigations 
introduced two large ideas that play a 
monumental role in how we can frame 
thoughts in a narrative, words in a 
sentence, and our relation to both of 
these schemes. In Tractatus he lays 
out seven propositions that, although 
different from his later works, still 
provide insight regarding how we can 
look at the world. First he lays out that 
the world is facts and then follows up 
with the notion that the logical picture 
of those facts resides in the realm of 
thought (Biletzki). His second point, 
that both Frege and Derrida point out 
as well, is that meaning is found only 
in context, proposition, and use 
(Philosophical Investigations §43; 
5 
 
 
represents a specific image or symbol, 
in particular super simple ones. This 
case study of W.J. was the catalyst of 
Gazzaniga’s most ambitious project, that 
of “the interpreter.” He found that the 
right hemisphere is unable to label the 
world with words upon recent 
callostomy, whereas the left hemisphere 
is the origin of inner-narrative (Bower). 
Hence, this was the birth of the pop-
neuroscientific theory of the left 
hemisphere being analytic and the right 
artistic (Connors). This inner-narrative 
would attempt to combine the sensory 
information coming from both fields of 
vision while still rendering the participant 
completely unconscious of what they are 
being presented with to the right 
hemisphere. “For instance, one man had 
a picture of a chicken claw flashed to his 
left hemisphere and a picture of a snow 
scene presented to his right hemisphere. 
From the ensuing selection of pictures, 
Tractatus 42; Foundations of 
Arithmetic 71; Derrida 114-115). Just 
as there is no self without the external, 
there is no meaning in a word without 
the context of its use in a proposition. 
A good example of this is the 
comparison between the two phrases 
“Trieste is no Vienna,” and “Vienna is 
the capital of Austria” (Collected 
Papers 189). Although the same word 
is employed, it is glaringly obvious that 
the same meaning is not evoked. Take 
the case of “Trieste is no Vienna”: by 
saying that Trieste is no Vienna, the 
commentator is not necessarily saying 
that the physical cities are not the 
same, for that is obvious, instead this 
person is calling to attention the 
greatness of Vienna (perchance a 
sense of higher culture, different 
cultural norms) and saying that Trieste 
does not live up to this idea of Vienna. 
In the second case, that of “Vienna is 
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he correctly chose a shovel with his left 
hand (controlled by the right 
hemisphere) and a chicken with his right 
hand (controlled by the left hemisphere). 
When asked to explain his choices, he 
responded: ‘Oh, that's simple. The 
chicken claw goes with the chicken, and 
you need a shovel to clean out the 
chicken shed’” (Bower). What this gave 
rise to, outside of Gazzaniga’s career, 
was the importance of narrative – what 
he later deemed as “the interpreter” - in 
the explanation of how our brain 
conveys information, and whether or not 
this narrative arrives prior to, or following 
neurophysiological process.  
 In order to give this research any 
due justice, we cannot ignore the 
processes behind the interpreter; we 
must first look deeper at the neural level 
in order to gain a fuller picture of just 
what exactly is happening under the 
hood to give rise to this “inner narrative.” 
the capital of Austria” the person is 
making a declarative claim regarding 
the social-political designation of 
Vienna itself, and not necessarily 
evoking conversation or implying 
anything regarding the culture and 
practices of the city. If one were to 
represent the thought with symbols 
they couldn’t even utilize the same 
symbol for “Vienna” across the 
statements (Conant 234). With this 
case of meaning in context and use, I 
assert that it would be helpful (and 
ultimately necessary) to put one’s 
name or symbol under the same 
scrutiny.  
 These questions of meaning as 
use, and finding one’s self in need of a 
larger narrative in order to have 
identity in context are the questions 
that plagued a young David Foster 
Wallace as he was writing his first 
novel, The Broom of the System. 
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As has been shown many times before, 
mood states, perception, thoughts, 
religious beliefs, and even utilitarian 
proclivities have physiological correlates 
within the brain itself, which can even be 
manipulated by the use of magnetic 
fields (Borckardt; Persinger; Fumagalli). 
Just as these tendencies and states 
have physiological correlates, so does 
the “inner narrative” that one hears in 
the form of their stream of conscious 
reality: the left hemisphere (Franks 35).                             
Now that there is a general idea of 
where this physiological correlate lies, 
we must look more closely at what is 
actually happening physiologically.  
 Neurons, the main cells of 
communication that lie within the brain, 
are composed of three basic parts - the 
dendrites (incoming communication), the 
soma (the cell body - powerhouse), and 
the axon (outgoing communication). 
These neurons usually communicate via 
These burning questions urged him to 
place the main character of the story, 
Lenore Beadsman, in the middle of a 
reality that is nothing but 
Wittgensteinian by nature – perfect to 
prod the notions of meaning and 
construct.  
 Lenore is a telephone 
switchboard operator from a family 
with the most well-known last name in 
their town, East Corinth, Ohio (which 
her father owns). As we will see, those 
that surround her predetermine 
everything about her. She got her 
name from her great-grandmother 
“which is to say […] the person under 
whose aegis [she]’d first experienced 
chocolate, books, swing sets, 
antimonies, pencil games, contract 
bridge, the Desert…” and every other 
formed aspect of her memorable life 
(Wallace 31). Her boyfriend, Rick 
Vigorous, a sexually impotent 
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specific chemicals: neurotransmitters. 
These neurotransmitters are released 
once they are “signaled” to, and that 
signal is in the form of an electrical 
pulse, commonly known as the action 
potential. Once this action potential, or 
electrical signal, reaches the axon, 
calcium ions flow into the cell causing 
the neurotransmitters at the end of the 
axon to release into the junction 
between the axon and another cell’s 
dendritic tree. Once this chemical signal 
jumps to another neuron the process 
propagates (Seung 42-44). This 
jumping, signaling, and communicating 
is exactly what the underlying 
neurophysiological correlates consist of, 
lending us another way of analyzing 
what exactly is provoking this 
“interpreter” that Gazzaniga puts forth.  
 Supposing that Gazzaniga’s 
comprehensive research regarding 
narrative in the human mind is correct, 
publisher, makes up for his impotency 
by lying in bed besides Lenore and 
reading her stories that were sent in to 
him or that he wrote (unbeknownst to 
her) that he knows will move her 
emotionally and affect her life 
decisions (Wallace 27). These stories 
range from problematic tales of an 
obvious foil to Vigorous burning down 
the towns he lives in and the homes 
that he calls his own all the way to 
stories of a man that falls in love with 
every woman he sees until he finally 
connects with one - an extremely 
unattractive woman with a tree toad in 
her neck. Luckily for Vigorous, he not 
only has the bedroom to sculpt Lenore 
into the person he and everyone in the 
town all desired, but she was also 
easily convinced to see the same 
therapist that he does, Dr. Jay, who 
holds his patient’s privacy with no 
regard (Wallace 61). Fittingly, he loves 
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there are a few more questions and 
paths that we must follow in order to get 
a satisfactory explanation of “the 
interpreter.” Firstly, we must look at what 
makes these neurophysiological 
processes arise and whether or not 
these processes are direct equation with 
what we consider the human 
consciousness and action, or whether 
consciousness just bubbles out as 
afterthoughts attempting to validate the 
actions of our own pre-determined mind, 
notions and processes in order to feel a 
sense of control in our lives. One way to 
approach this inquisition is by looking at 
previous experiments that have teased 
out certain elements of 
neurophysiological activity (usually by 
way of functional magnetic resonance 
imaging (fMRI)), subjective accounts of 
consciousness, and, finally, a timing of 
the physical action itself in order to 
analyze the role that each of these 
to tell stories of Lenore to Vigorous, 
cementing her reality into Vigorous’ 
mind.  
 In one session of talking to Dr. 
Jay, Lenore finally breaks grounds on 
the problems that her great-
grandmother imposed on her: 
“Suppose Gramma tells me really 
convincingly that all that really exists of 
my life is what can be said about it?...it 
seems like it’s not really like a life 
that’s told, not lived; it’s just that the 
living is the telling, that there’s nothing 
going on with me that isn’t either told 
or tellable, and if so, what’s the 
difference, why live at all?... If there’s 
nothing to be said about me, what 
separates me from this lady in this 
story Rick got who eats junk food and 
gains weight and squashes her child in 
her sleep?... Gramma says she’s 
going to show me how a life is words 
and nothing else. Gramma says words 
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mentioned measurements plays in 
producing said action.  
 While there are many experiments 
that approach this question in ways 
similar to these described, most notably 
Libet, Haynes, Fried, and Hallett, I will 
be primarily focusing on those of Libet, 
Haynes, and Fried. In the 80’s, Libet 
recruited nine participants and 
conducted 40 trials of requesting them to 
move their wrist at their own volition and 
report back to him the time that they 
“consciously decided” to do such. While 
this task was occurring, he was 
recording their neurophysiological 
activity with an electroencephalography 
machine. From this he was able to show 
that their individual 
Bereitschaftspotentials, or readiness 
potentials, occurred (on average) an 
entire 850ms before the reported sense 
of volition preceding wrist movement 
(200ms before the actual muscle 
can kill and create. Everything” 
(Wallace 119-120). Her great-
grandmother of the same name was 
an old understudy of Wittgenstein, who 
continuously and confusingly stressed 
to Lenore the question of what the 
most useful part of a broomstick is, the 
broomstick or the broom bristles: 
“Meaning as fundamentalness. 
Fundamentalness as use. Meaning as 
use” (Wallace 150).  
 Great-grandmother Lenore was 
in a retirement home and all the while 
running Lenore’s thoughts with her 
antimonies and questions surrounding 
linguistics and meaning. Soon, feeling 
as if she had completely lost her 
“function” in society – leading to a loss 
of identity due to the Wittgensteinian 
notion of meaning as usage/function – 
great-grandmother Lenore escapes 
her retirement facility with some sort of 
“green book,” leaving behind her blue 
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movement). Now, as most anyone could 
point out, this study was flawed in many 
ways - particularly crude means of 
measurements - but it also certainly 
provided a stepping stone for future 
studies and inquiries on such the large 
question. Because of the advancement 
of the technology surrounding fMRI, 
people like Haynes had the opportunity 
to run a very similar experiment while 
collecting much more accurate and 
indicative data. Haynes informed the 
participants that they have the option of 
pressing either the button in their left 
hand, or their right, at whichever time 
they choose. These participants were in 
an fMRI scanner throughout the entirety 
of the experiment, and it was found that 
a full seven seconds before the 
participants pushed either button, 
activity was seen in their Broadmann’s 
Area 10, a region commonly associated 
with higher-level planning. The most 
and brown ones, alluding to some sort 
of development and improvement 
upon Wittgenstein’s Blue and Brown 
Books with her own Green (Wallace 
40). All of this to say, Lenore’s entire 
life consists of, is defined as, and is 
even prescribed by words. Everything 
that she is made up of is 
predetermined by these words, 
whether it is her name (that of her 
great-grandmother’s), the town that 
she lives in (that of her father’s), her 
experiences (imposed upon by her 
great-grandmother), or even the 
“problems” that she faces (forced upon 
her by Vigorous) that dictates that she 
attend a therapist; nothing in Lenore’s 
life is of her own construction, but 
instead prescribed upon by sources 
exterior to her, forcing this construct 
into a purely Wittgensteinian world.  
With that being said, in order to 
understand a world of words, one that 
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monumental part of this study was not 
only that Haynes could tell a full seven 
seconds before these participants when 
they were going to “randomly” press a 
button, but he also could determine, with 
significantly more accuracy than random 
guessing or odds would produce, which 
hand they were going to press the 
button with. Once the fMRI gave clear 
images of the more active areas of the 
brain while the participant was making 
the decision of which hand to press the 
button with, neuroscientist Itzhak Fried 
utilized these clear images and 
implanted an electrode in said areas 
within an epileptic population. Able to 
record single neuron action potentials, 
Fried was able to determine which hand 
they were going to use at an astounding 
80% accuracy (Libet; Smith). 
 Although these exciting results may 
seem like they necessitate painting the 
participant into the realm of a 
can seemingly dictate the running 
narrative of one’s life, one must always 
go back to the starting block: the word.  
 In many works of fiction there is a 
certain fixation around being able to 
control the usage of words, dictating 
what exactly the meaning behind 
someone’s name in a social setting is, 
telling stories about others, and even 
highlighting the truth behind fiction; but 
where exactly does this fixation take 
us and what does it tell us? Whether it 
is Humbert Humbert’s exclamation of 
his Lolita (denoting a very obvious 
although seemingly immaterial 
relationship of ownership and control) 
or Vigorous’ muttering of “So you do 
love me, then. I do have you, after 
all…Some words have to be explicitly 
uttered, Lenore…Some words can 
literally make things real” after painting 
a caricature of her life, I assert that this 
notion, this necessary narrative, is one 
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deterministic machine, there are many 
scientists arguing that the narrative, 
which was mentioned earlier on, is 
present in our minds at all times and can 
indeed affect physiological events 
occurring in our brains. Michael 
Gazzaniga provides us with an account 
that could potentially deal with this 
question: “[f]irst—and this has to do with 
the very nature of brain-enabled 
conscious experience itself—we humans 
enjoy mental states that arise from our 
underlying neuronal, cell-to-cell 
interactions. Mental states do not exist 
without those interactions. At the same 
time, they cannot be defined or 
understood by knowing only the cellular 
interactions. Mental states that emerge 
from our neural actions do constrain the 
very brain activity that gave rise to them. 
Mental states such as beliefs, thoughts, 
and desires all arise from brain activity 
and in turn can and do influence our 
of attempted and usually successful 
imposed control. Reducing a character 
to a linguistic construct, to a single 
word, which you dictate, brings to mind 
Wittgenstein’s notion of meaning as 
use. Using a person’s name in a 
narrative, even one that you concoct or 
control, imparts meaning on this 
person that you are using as a 
construct. Just as Lenore’s great-
grandmother stressed that the 
essence of the broom could be any 
aspect of it depending on the function 
of it, to utilize someone in a narrative 
in which they are conveyed as a two-
dimensional construct is nothing short 
of forcing them into an instrumental 
role, a role that they have no control 
over and that is seemingly at the 
mercy of the narrator, not the world 
around them. Jay provides a perfect 
example of this while describing to 
Vigorous Lenore’s new lover: “My area 
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decisions to act one way or another. 
 Ultimately, these interactions will 
only be understood with a new 
vocabulary that captures the fact that 
two different layers of stuff are 
interacting in such a way that existing 
alone animates neither” (Gazzaniga 
167-168).  Gazzaniga asserts that we 
need an entirely new vocabulary in order 
to describe these mental states that 
have both top-down and bottom up 
components and constraints. John 
Doyle, a teacher at Caltech, notes in 
alliance with Gazzaniga that what we 
first need to shirk in order to understand 
this problem, is the urge to utilize 
Aristotelian categories, or more simply 
put - the urge to use language of 
causation (Gazzaniga 168). This 
language of causation is one that is very 
near and dear to us. The very fact that 
this is the case raises the problem of 
free-will itself, where most 
is the fact that Lang constructs a 
Lenore, constructs her the way we 
each of course construct, impose our 
frameworks of perception and 
understanding on…[s]he is trapped 
and two-dimensional and unreal…Ah, 
but then he puts marks, initials, his 
initials on her, in her” (Wallace 343-
344).  
 Although the notion of a top-
down narrative forcing a role onto a 
single being is easily taken up, we 
must ask ourselves what the bottom-
up role of the person has on that 
overarching narrative – if anything – 
and if that role has enough strength in 
order to alter the overarching narrative, 
enough to free the individual character 
from being forced into a construct, a 2-
dimensional caricature. There are 
multiple relationships at play in this 
paradigm and they seemingly reinforce 
a feedback loop: the relationship 
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neuroscientists stake their claim that 
free-will is in fact an illusion. Gazzaniga 
gets at this problem with some very 
convincing scenarios, calling into 
question conscious volition: “As a 
person is walking, the sensory inputs 
from the visual and auditory systems go 
to the thalamus, a type of relay station. 
Then the impulses are sent to the 
processing areas in the cortex and then 
relayed to the frontal cortex. There they 
are integrated with other higher mental 
processes and perhaps the information 
makes it into the stream of 
consciousness, which is when a person 
becomes consciously aware of the 
information (there is a snake!). In the 
case of the rattler, memory then kicks in 
the information that rattlesnakes are 
poisonous and what the consequences 
of a rattlesnake bite are, and I make a 
decision (I don’t want it to bite me), 
quickly calculate how close I am to the 
between the actions of the individual 
and the role that they play in the 
narrative (for example, any move that 
Lolita makes early in the novel 
reinforces the sexual hue that HH sees 
them in), the actions of the narrative 
and how they play with the individual 
(when one is told that they are a failure 
their entire life, they are more prone to 
be more critical on even their 
successes than others), and the words 
of the narrative and how they play with 
the construct of the individual (when 
describing a person to a stranger, the 
narrative of that person being 
described is the only source of the 
construct of this person) (Nabokov). I 
propose that the most effective way to 
deal with these interactions is to 
analyze the power relationships that 
are created in between characters in a 
narrative; more specifically, which 
interrelationship has the most dictating 
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snake and its striking distance, and 
answer a question: Do I need to change 
my current direction, and speed? Yes, I 
should move back. A command is sent 
to put the muscles into gear and then do 
it. All this processing takes a long time, 
up to a second or two, and I could have 
been bitten while I was still in the midst 
of it. Luckily, however, all that doesn’t 
have to occur” (Gazzaniga 76). The 
brain instead takes a shortcut through 
the amygdala and the conflation of this 
neurophysiological event is the 
invocation of the interpreter – all the 
while lacking the need of a micro-
interpreter. We speak of and experience 
all of these situations as reflexes and as 
if there is a cause and an event, but this 
is where we are clearly lacking in our 
vocabulary.  
 Before we can start looking into 
how exactly our vocabulary is the thing 
that is holding us back, we must first 
power, which one can override all of 
the others in the end.  
 When the individual (the subject 
of a proposed narrative) interacts with 
the narrative (or more aptly the one 
telling the narrative) there is a strong 
area of disconnect. Say the individual 
acts against the proposed narrative; 
there is the strong possibility that they 
will do nothing but evoke a strong 
reaction, an attempt at lessening the 
dissonance present. “Whatever 
evolution this or that popular character 
has gone through between the book 
covers, his fate is fixed in our minds, 
and, similarly, we expect our friends to 
follow this or that logical and 
conventional pattern we have fixed for 
them. Thus X will never compose the 
immortal music that would clash with 
the second rate symphonies he has 
accustomed us to. Y will never commit 
murder. Under no circumstances can Z 
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look at a phenomena termed 
“emergence,” a concept that has been 
discussed since the time of Aristotle 
(Aristotle). “Emergence is when micro-
level complex systems that are far from 
equilibrium (thus allowing for the 
amplification of random events) self-
organize (creative, self-generated, 
adaptability-seeking behavior) into new 
structures, with new properties that 
previously did not exist, to form a new 
level of organization on the macro level” 
potentially giving rise to what we 
perceive of as the mind (Gazzaniga 
195). Just as a steady collection of cars 
in a city can give rise to an instance of a 
traffic jam, which is almost self 
sustaining and necessarily has 
completely different characteristics than 
the cars themselves, so purportedly can 
(purportedly) individual neurons give rise 
to a mental state, an interpreter, or a 
consciousness, that has completely 
ever betray us” (Nabokov 265). 
Therefore, the effect that this 
counterintuitive action has on the 
narrative as a whole can almost only 
be seen as counteractive to the notion 
of an individual “correcting” their own 
narrative. Let’s say the individual acts 
in agreement with the notion that the 
narrative propagates; the problem here 
is that of causation. It is not known 
whether the action is the cause of the 
narrative or the narrative the cause of 
the action, leaving this notion 
incredibly ambiguous; for example, 
when Lolita sits on HH’s lap in a 
sexual manner, is it because this is the 
actual act that she chooses to do and 
the connotation that she wishes it to 
have, or it is because the narrative 
forces this hue on the act of Lolita? 
Although this notion is ambiguous, 
there are still insights to be gained 
within the thought of self-fulfilling 
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different characteristics and properties 
than the neurons themselves. If this 
statement is true, it may be feasible that 
this account of emergence provides us a 
way out of the problem that is the 
interaction of the mental state downward 
on the neuronal makeup. Gazzaniga’s 
argument from analogy is the only thing 
that allows him to hang onto this hope: 
“What has become obvious to most 
physicists […] is that at different levels of 
structure, there are different types of 
organization with completely different 
types of interactions governed by 
different laws, and one emerges from 
the other but does not emerge 
predictably. This is even true for 
something as basic as water turning to 
ice, as physicist Robert Laughlin has 
pointed out: Ice has so far been found to 
have eleven distinct crystalline phases, 
but none of them were predicted by first 
principles!” (Gazzaniga 197). What his 
prophecy.  
 The strongest of the three 
interactions though, I propose, is that 
of the metaphysical interaction of the 
narrative on the construct of the 
individual. Though a construct (usually 
defined as an idea formed in people’s 
mind) of a person can be formed in the 
mind of said person themselves, the 
most predominant usage of the identity 
construct lies outside of the individual’s 
mind. Usually, this identity is only to be 
formed and utilized by someone that is 
not that person, leaving the person 
himself or herself without control over 
this construct. When one is told a story 
about (John did this, John did that) 
there is no locus of volition, the 
individual being told about and 
constructed is nothing but a victim of 
the language being used in the 
narrative being provided about them 
and its purposes for the teller. Meaning 
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provocation of the imagery of water does 
to the problem of top-down causation is 
nothing short of a Texas sharp-shooter 
fallacy1. By stressing the similarities of a 
neuron giving rise to the mental state 
and water giving rise to ice (even 
different and unpredictable forms of ice) 
he is pulling the reader’s attention away 
from the problematic notion that, yes, 
these both give rise to one another, but 
if we are looking at the top-down 
causation we are talking about two 
completely different things. To say that 
the ice can affect the water that 
constitutes it is a more logical and 
intuitive statement for it follows that 
material can indeed affect material, but 
to stress that a mental state can affect 
the underlying neurological mechanisms 
is asserting something much more 
dangerous and problematic: the 
immaterial can affect the material. Now, 
as use.  
 Although this is seemingly the 
case, I assert that there is a larger 
structure outside of the narrative that 
gives rise to a certain feedback loop, 
which has the potential to have the 
most power over both the narrative 
and the subject of the narrative. The 
narrative world in which this narrative, 
by necessity, must take place provides 
an entirely new layer, which we must 
disassemble in order to understand the 
relationships at play below it. Just as a 
word must be used in a certain context 
in order to be sensible, so must the 
narrative. This meta-narrative that 
incases the individual narrative can 
take many forms in literature. In some 
cases it can almost simply be boiled 
down to the setting that surrounds the 
narrative - take the post-Hiroshima 
setting that dictates the endeavors and 
                                                        
1 The Texas sharp-shooter fallacy is the act ignoring the differences inherent in data in order to stress similarities; e.g. a Texan 
shooting the side of a barn and painting a target over the most prevalent cluster of bullet holes.  
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the evident rejoinder would most likely 
be that “well, yeah, but the main point of 
the phenomena of emergence is that it 
DOES have the ability to change the 
properties in the process.” This is 
seemingly problematic once one takes 
heed to the fact that we are only able to 
account for mental states in subjective 
explanations and neurological activity 
underlying them. Though this notion 
might at first seem troublesome, I assert 
that we must look to other pertinent 
structures in society that might either 
resolve this discrepancy, or at least help 
to parse out the details of it, in order to, 
hopefully, start to be able to clearly see 
the feedback loops that are present in 
the brain and the world surrounding it.  
 Although it is conceptually simple 
to start with the neuron and go up, we 
must not forget the input that must occur 
in order to result in these neurons firing. 
At every instant we, as conscious 
drives of John/Jonah in Vonnegut’s 
Cat’s Cradle, or even just the effect of 
the global political climate of southern 
France for Humbert Humbert in Lolita 
(Vonnegut, Nabokov). But even more 
abstracted than the setting itself, there 
are the social practices that surround 
the narrative – such as the subversive 
nature of San Lorenzo towards 
Bokononism in Cat’s Cradle, which 
frames and formulates Jonah’s initial 
reaction to boko-maru (the religious 
act of two people pressing the naked 
soles of their feet together, in order to 
evoke mingled and joint awareness 
and enlightenment) (Vonnegut). These 
various contexts must dictate and 
interact with the underlying narrative in 
ways that necessitate a change the 
nature of the narrative itself.  
 This feedback loop that I am 
proposing seems to raise one large 
question: is it possible (or even 
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beings, are being bombarded with 
perceptions and even psychological 
imperatives from the society and social 
structures that inevitably surround us. 
Though some of these are material, 
architectural structures, pathways, and 
public transport, there are also many 
immaterial structures that we must 
interact with in every instant. Some of 
these immaterial structures, while still 
giving rise to material structures, consist 
of ideological biases imposed by culture, 
social norms, laws, and even 
preconceptions. All of these immaterial 
structures come loaded into the 
perception of the world around us - how 
we experience our surroundings as a 
whole. These perceptions, in turn, are 
necessarily substrates of a larger 
feedback loop, which includes the neural 
level in our brains.  
 What exactly would this feedback 
loop look like though, and how does it 
sensible/justifiable) to make logical a 
single narrative in the absence of the 
other narratives within the feedback 
loop? Let us explore a few examples in 
order to further understand this 
question (see figure 1). First, we will 
take a look at a meta-narrative that 
seemingly surrounds every 
relationship and other narrative in 
Lolita: the setting of the scene. The 
surrounding space is a necessary 
realm in which every other narrative 
must occur. From here we will then 
look at the invisible structures that feed 
into the narratives that we are 
analyzing. Some of these invisible 
structures include simple things such 
as social norms, and more complex 
things such as the way that romance 
with a younger girl is treated and 
therefore tinted to those that have any 
connection to it. These social norms 
and expectations feed into the actions 
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provide enough response in order to 
amend its own neural substrates? Take 
a normal situation for an example: you 
are sitting at a coffee shop. Continuously 
you are receiving a stream of 
perception, but with that perception 
comes an inseparable amount of 
information regarding the social situation 
surrounding you, not only the 
perceivable information but also the 
underlying information. Every action that 
you take from that moment on feeds 
right back into this loop; as soon as you 
commit to an action you are forced to 
see this action within the social 
information that is underlying the 
situation, completely changing the 
possible perception of even your own 
action. 
  Though we can further our 
understanding of these perceptions and 
how our brains respond to the 
underlying information that is contained 
of Lolita (the person), Humbert 
Humbert (HH), and the narrative that 
HH provides us of Lolita (the 
construct).  
 For example, whenever HH 
drops by Lolita’s house (the 
surrounding space and context) on 
Hunter Road to find her pregnant and 
married, there are multiple narratives 
present that are forcing him to act the 
way he does. Knowing that he cannot 
personify Lolita as his early sex-slave 
to her new husband, HH takes on the 
role of her father; while this isn’t 
necessarily a false role, it is one that is 
certainly undermined by the master 
role that he more predominately 
personifies himself with. It wasn’t until 
Dick, “Dolly’s” husband left the room 
that HH could resume the role of 
jealous ex-lover and force out of Lolita 
the name of the lover that took her 
away from him: Quilty (Nabokov 274-
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in every situation by studying further the 
lower substituents in the brain, I assert 
that with the complication of emergence 
we must not only take the more 
prevalent bottom-up notion of constraint 
into account, but also the potential top-
down/bottom-up interactions that are 
happening behind the scenes. Though 
some of these complicated interactions 
are undoubtedly being looked into in 
very important ways (such as the study 
of the effect of abstract belief systems 
on readiness potentials and perception 
of voluntary behavior) I assert that we 
must also look into the 
phenomenological reality of the 
consciousness at an individual level to 
further understand these interactions in 
a more holistic way (Rigoni et al.).  
 
 
277). Within the social norms present 
in this situation, there is the 
demonstration that HH cannot even 
view Lolita as the same construct, but 
instead deems her Dolly. Within 
different context, there is inherently 
different meaning. With these 
structures in mind, we can now turn 
our attention to a single example of the 
young Lolita’s (the person’s) actions 
and how the narrative that HH 
provides affects them. These actions 
feed into HH’s narrative, but they do so 
in a very peculiar way; while they 
might be innocent in nature – childish 
acts and movements – they are still 
tinged by the nature of HH’s narrative 
itself, and therefore they create a sort 
of feedback loop, which changes the 
perceived nature of these actions all 
together. “I was sitting, Humbert the 
Hoarse put his arm around her in a 
miserable imitation of blood-
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relationship; and still studying, 
somewhat shortsightedly, the piece of 
paper she held, my innocent little 
visitor slowly sank to a half-sitting 
position upon my knee. Her adorable 
profile, parted lips, warm hair were 
some three inches from my bared 
eyetooth…All at once, I knew I could 
kiss her” (Nabokov 48). Now, with 
these actions tinted and hued in the 
favor of HH’s running narrative (thanks 
to cognitive bias), there is the 
possibility for HH to create an entirely 
new Lolita, the construct of Lolita.  
 Although the narrative itself can 
have an effect on the nature of Lolita’s 
actions, it seems like Lolita (the 
construct) is the only connection and 
entity that is created by a single 
stream and unable to affect any other 
relationship or narrative. The actions 
are painted prior to perception for HH, 
therefore when this narrative creates in 
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his mind the construct of Lolita, there 
is no hand in the game but his own 
narrative. “In point of fact, there might 
have been no Lolita at all had I not 
loved…[w]hat I had madly possessed 
was not she, but my own creation, 
another, fanciful Lolita – perhaps, 
more real that Lolita; overlapping, 
encasing her; floating between me and 
her, and having no will, no 
consciousness – indeed, no life of her 
own” (Nabokov 9, 62).  
 We must not forget, though, that 
in the outcome of this story no one is 
able to escape these top-down 
constraints of narratives, not even HH. 
HH notes this towards the very end of 
his own story: “This, I said to myself, 
was the end of the ingenious play 
staged for me by Quilty” (Nabokov 
305). Now that we have a certain idea 
of what a top-down narrative can do 
and necessarily does do to a 
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construct, we must in turn ask what the 
narrative can do for an individual and 
whether or not there is a significant 
difference between the two, and how 
we ought to perceive our own 
narratives that gives rise to these 
constructs.  
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Convergence 
 
“For while the passage of light into the brain is an instance of standard physical 
causation, the gaze that looks out most certainly is not” (Tallis). 
 
 Commonly pitted against each other instead of used together in order to 
augment the implications that each realm holds, the neuroscientific and linguistic 
accounts of narrative and free-will actually have quite a lot in common and can 
build upon each other. As referenced above, Tallis makes the assertion that 
although there is the presence of the standard account of physical causation 
within the act of perception and the brain, there is still a disconnect in-between 
that and the way that the mind colors the perception itself. From this assertion we 
must be pushed to ask a series of questions: Does this gaze account for the 
human will? Does this gaze color perception in ways that have causal 
implications that can be mapped on reality?  
 Though Nietzsche’s view of the will and consciousness is a topic of much 
debate, it certainly serves as a useful stepping-stone in comprehending what we 
are dealing with in terms of narrative and will. Many have spent time arguing that 
Nietzsche’s will is that of an epiphenomenal meta-effect, that is, lacking any sort 
of causal efficacy in terms of will (Leiter). The more thorough and seemingly 
logically consistent reading of Nietzsche’s works yields an entirely different 
picture though; Nietzsche’s will is that of an incremental and microscopic nature. 
What Nietzsche asserts, which is seemingly in line with Tallis’ view of the gaze, is 
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that although the faculty of consciousness (the “I” willing) is worth critique, the 
causal efficacy of it is not.  
With the assertion that “what really arouses indignation against suffering is 
not suffering as such but really the meaningless of suffering,” Nietzsche is 
seemingly making the claim that what moves us “is not sensation as such, but 
sensation coupled with a thought about its meaning” (On the Genealogy of 
Morality  II.7 & Katsafanas 202). So, following the common conception of a 
feedback loop, the implications follow that any perception (“passage of light into 
the brain”) is meaningless and has no value that can be mapped upon it until it 
reaches the realm of the consciousness, which in turn can create the personal 
narrative (an act of categorization, an evocation of meaning, “the gaze that looks 
out”) that can run alongside the action, and provide meaning. There are two 
helpful examples that Katsafanas gives us in order to more easily understand this 
notion. The first example is that of exercise. Exercise, to the extent that it brings 
pain and tiredness to people, is something that is contingent upon the nature of 
the person’s consciousness that it is colored. Some people love the pain and 
anguish so much that it becomes an addiction, whereas others cannot even 
stand the thought of it. The second example provided is sex outside of marriage 
in religious populations and non-religious populations. The same physical act is 
committed, yet one’s consciousness is able to color the act in a way that it haunts 
the person with guilt, whereas the other can see it as an act of pure joy. But what 
are the constituents of this consciousness and what can affect it? 
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 Though Nietzsche argues that unconsciousness is a realm of 
nonconceptually articulated content, he still supports the notion that such has an 
effect on the conscious states that can arise. If one has an unconscious state 
that is of a certain mental-affect, this, in essence, changes the perception of the 
conscious state itself. Therefore, in order to start willing and start changing the 
conceptual content that arises within the conscious state, we must first attack the 
unconscious. This is where Nietzsche’s case for incremental willing takes form.  
 
Motives causally impact the conscious experiences 
related to willing, which in turn causally influence the 
motives; out of this process, we get a potentially 
reconfigured set of motives, with new motivational 
propensities. This new set of motives might again 
causally influence the conscious experiences related 
to willing and so on. Action results from all of this. 
(Katsafanas 206) 
 
So, this entails that “we have to learn to think differently – in order at last, 
perhaps very late on, to attain even more: to feel differently” (Daybreak 103). I 
will return to my previous examples of sex and exercise in order to more clearly 
explain this quote. If we are to “learn to think differently… in order … to feel 
differently” in the realm of exercise, we could instead focus on the fact that we 
are bettering ourselves and our bodies, have this constantly in our mind, and 
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start to associate the pain brought about by extreme exercise to this bettering. 
Once this association is steadily in place, the pain will be only a feeling of 
bettering and will be felt and perceived in a completely different way. The sex 
example also works accordingly: Take for example a young fundamentalist that 
holds pre-marital sex as one of the largest sins that one can commit in their 
young lives. Say they slip up and find themselves in a situation in which they are 
partaking in such the activity. This partaking will be filled with all sorts of feelings 
of remorse and regret, not to mention the lasting guilt that will follow the activity. 
Now, picture the same person a year later after they shirked their radical faith. As 
long as there are no lasting ties of religious guilt, this activity would play out 
completely differently. The person would partake in the activity, feel differently 
during it, perceive differently during it, and, in turn, be different during it. It is 
important to note though, that these transformations of “being” differently are not 
of immediate nature, they are instead long incremental processes that take a lot 
of conscious effort; the once fundamentalist person does not just shake all 
notions of religious guilt in one conscious thought, but instead works on it for long 
periods of time, only to finally be and feel different. This is the nature of the 
incremental will – which, as we will see, runs parallel to our contemporary notions 
of Cognitive Behavioral Therapy, yet seemingly happens at a more individual and 
self-conscious level.  
 Though the notion of an incremental will is a complicated one, we must be 
pushed to put this in conversation with what we are able to do with the narratives 
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that we provide ourselves and others. Nietzsche, yet again, gives us a way to 
look at the power that is inherently present within narrative and construct:  
 
Only as creators! – This has given me the greatest 
trouble and still does: to realize that what things are 
called is incomparably more important than what they 
are. The reputation, name and appearance, the usual 
measure and weight of a thing, what it counts for – 
originally almost always wrong and arbitrary, thrown 
over things like a dress and altogether foreign to their 
nature and even to their skin – all this grows from 
generation unto generation, merely because people 
believe in it, until it gradually grows to be part of the 
thing and turns into its very body. (The Gay Science 
213) 
 
What this aphorism forces us to recall are a few things already discussed: 
Lenore’s conception and struggle as a linguistic construct, Wittgenstein’s 
meaning as use, the sometimes problematic narrative that our own brain 
provides in order to explain situations that occur outside of us, the power of our 
own incremental will in destroying and creating constructs, and culture’s 
incremental will in destroying and creating the same things. This ability to will a 
meaning (in even a single usage) and have it “gradually grow to be part of the 
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thing and turn into its very body,” certainly carries ethical implication with our 
capacity to will a narrative or even the notion of an individual’s psyche; but, what 
exactly must we be held responsible for in the mere act of concocting narratives 
on a daily basis? Amongst many others, Slovenian philosopher, Slavoj Zizek, has 
touched on this notion:  
 
What if, however, humans exceed animals in their 
capacity for violence precisely because they speak? 
As Hegel was already well aware, there is something 
violent in the very symbolisation of a thing, which 
equals its mortification. This violence operates at 
multiple levels. Language simplifies the designated 
thing, reducing it to a single feature. It dismembers 
the thing, destroys its organic unity, treating its parts 
and properties as autonomous. It inserts the thing into 
a field of meaning which is ultimately external to it. 
When we name gold “gold,” we violently extract a 
metal from its natural texture, investing into it our 
dreams of wealth, power, spiritual purity, and so on, 
which have nothing whatsoever to do with the 
immediate reality of gold. (Zizek 52) 
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 The ongoing example of Lolita can help clarify Zizek’s point. Just as 
language simplifies, destroys organic unity, and treats one aspect of an intricate 
thing with parts and properties as autonomous, HH reduces and simplifies Lolita 
into a single entity, a two-dimensional character (reminiscent of Lenore), that of a 
prepubescent sex object. The entire organic unity of Lolita, a normal and 
innocent child living out her life and acting as any child would, is stripped and in 
turn made into the autonomous sexual entity that HH chooses. Akin to how our 
usage of gold as describing an earth metal has steadily turned into a word filled 
with notions of greed, power-struggle, and other completely irrelevant and tainted 
attributes, so has HH’s usage of Lolita’s name and construct within the narrative 
of his own desire changed from person to sexual object. Whenever the thought of 
Lolita comes to mind, it must be put into reference with this field of meaning that 
encompasses the non-organic simplified “Lolita.” In doing this, as described in 
the figure below, every action Lolita makes must be misconstrued in order to fit 
within this pre-existing framework and field of meaning. The real nature of the 
childish Lolita is violently taken from her and instead imposed upon with HH’s 
sexual desires, just as humans impose irrelevant ideas into the element of gold. 
This is showcased very clearly even on the first page of the novel itself which 
was referenced earlier on: “She was Lo, plain Lo, in the morning, standing four 
feet ten in one sock. She was Lola in slacks. She was Dolly at school. She was 
Dolores on the dotted line. But in my arms she was always Lolita … In point of 
fact, there might have been no Lolita at all had I not loved, one summer, a certain 
initial girl-child” (Nabokov 9). As we can see with both the case of gold and the 
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case of Lolita, there is something violent and seemingly problematic surrounding 
the nature of our own consciousness and creation of language. We must be 
pushed to ask though, what are the implications? If this is indeed the nature of 
language, and in turn the nature of the brain, why does it matter if we can’t even 
avoid it? Before going into the more inherently violent aspects of language, it 
would be worthwhile to look at some of the better sides.  
 Though Nietzsche is using this passage in his infamous Birds of Prey 
aphorism to get at a completely different point than I am, I still find it helpful in 
terms of understanding the inherent seduction of language: 
 
A quantum of force is simply such a quantum of drive, 
will, action—rather, it is nothing but this very driving, 
willing, acting itself—and it cannot appear as anything 
else except through the seduction of language (and 
the fundamental errors of reason petrified in it), which 
understands and misunderstands all action as 
conditioned by something which causes actions, by a 
“Subject.” (On the Genealogy of Morality, Nietzsche) 
 
Because we are able, and almost forced, to perceive actions as dealt out by 
individuals, or “Subjects,” we must understand this action through the seduction 
of language. This seduction of language, though Nietzsche paints it as solely 
superfluous and irrelevant to driving, willing, or acting, is how we are able to 
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perceive these acts as positive or negative. This seduction is why we are able to 
smile at a surprising compliment, put the amorphous organic reality of love into 
words, conceive of abstract family, make compelling arguments within essays, or 
even blush at a dialogue given by a significant other. Without language there 
would be no romantic hue to actions and there would be no form in which to 
discuss the role of narratives within our own lives. With that being said, this 
obviously does not free us from the more violent aspects of language, nor 
remove the imperative to explore these aspects and implications.  
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Our Imperatives 
 Though the notion itself is seemingly strange, I assert that with the 
imperative to avoid more extreme cases of symbolic violence, we must be 
pushed to incrementally change both the conscious and unconscious states that 
can arise within our mind. As we saw with Gazzaniga’s split-brain patient there is 
some sort of tendency for narratives and thoughts to just “arise” without even 
willing them. As we saw, this was not only present in a neuroscientific analysis of 
running consciousness, but also within Nietzsche’s explanation of it as well; no 
matter what field we use to approach the questions surrounding narratives, there 
are implied imperatives present – change the neural correlates that give arise to 
affects, change the verbal constructs that can arise violently, and in turn change 
the narratives that can arise with said affects and constructs and vice versa. 
What is evident is that we cannot avoid these imperatives, for even if we are to 
grant that these narratives and immediate perceptions can arise without the “I” 
willing them, we still cannot shirk the responsibility that comes with the gaze that 
looks out. As Libet notes, “we may view voluntary acts as beginning with 
unconscious initiatives being ‘bubbled up’ by the brain.  The conscious will would 
then select which of these initiatives may go forward to an action, or which ones 
to veto and abort so no motor action occurs” (Libet 139). 
 With our presumed ability to color every perception that arises within the 
brain (even if we grant that said perception is out of our immediate control) we 
can now see where the responsibility lies on a personal basis. There is 
seemingly a natural imperative to analyze both the perception and the narrative 
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that follows in order to see its potential accordance with the narratives that 
surrounds us. With this accordance to various narratives (or lack thereof) comes 
an urge to work within our own narratives in order to change them, leaving open 
the possibility that the next time the perception arises, a different narrative will 
follow, perhaps filling in the gaps of discordance amongst relevant narratives. It is 
worth noting that this sense of dissonance and discordance found within the 
various narratives and metanarratives that make up the perception of our lives, is 
exactly where I assert that the ethical imperative lies. It is not the ethical 
imperative that drives the feedback loops present in our lives, but instead it is the 
feedback loops that create the urgency of the ethical imperative of clarifying our 
own narratives.  
 For example, upon arrival at Regis, my running narrative of everything 
having reductionist and deterministic roots constrained the thoughts that could 
arise with new information. Because of these foundations, I was unable to 
entertain deeper ideals of value, emergence, and perception without just jumping 
to the reductionist interpretation and calling it all malarkey. This was so for a 
couple of reasons. The main reason was the overarching narrative of social 
relations. I was constantly surrounded by students and teachers providing 
different narratives, that caused me, in an unconscious attempt to play into the 
narrative surrounding social cooperation, to entertain and attempt to harmonize 
with my own, even if I didn’t seem to agree with them. Because I have steadily 
been able to form and shift the thoughts that arise in my mind (upon notice of 
seeming discordance with the narratives around me), I am left with a much more 
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open perception of new ideas, leaving me able to more fairly and more 
comprehensively bring different notions into conversation with each other. With 
that being said, we must keep in check not only the narratives that we perceive 
but also the constructs used within these narratives. Knowing all too well that 
every single construct that is used within the running narrative of our mind entails 
the same implications of the word “gold” in Zizek’s example, or Lolita in 
Nabakov’s, we can take a much more aware and meticulous approach to the 
problems that are inherent in the mere act of language or consciousness.  
 Now that we have a clear understanding of what language itself does to a 
person or a construct, we must ask what it does in terms of one’s free-will. When 
one is used in a narrative, fiction or consciousness, there is a sense of 
constriction that is implied without any consent by the one being spoken about. 
This constriction is metaphysically confining the person into all of the things that 
are implied with the name itself. By constricting that person themselves, we are 
inadvertently taking away the extent to which this person can enact their own will.  
   Though, as argued before, the will is incremental, there is still reduction 
in this will when one can be restricted into a construct without even knowing 
about it (Thus X will never compose the immortal music that would clash with the 
second rate symphonies he has accustomed us to. Y will never commit murder. 
Under no circumstances can Z ever betray us…) (Nabokov 265).  So what can 
we do? As mentioned above, there is a conscious screening effort that must take 
place; but what exactly is this screening method supposed to do, and how does it 
affect the brain? If we are to take the notion of emergence seriously, and grant it 
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the attribute that it can in fact interact with the neural correlates beneath it, we 
can start to see how this view of incremental will is starting to make sense on 
both a philosophical and neuroscientific approach. When one changes the 
conscious state that is invoked when a construct is used or when a situation 
occurs outside of them, this, purportedly, will have downward causal effect on the 
neurons beneath the emergent state of consciousness. If we grant that this 
emergent interaction is both realistic and causal, then we are able to infer that 
this causality would evoke a change in the neuronal connections that lie as 
constituents within this emergent state. If this is the case, then the old adage that 
“neurons that fire together, wire together” is extremely pertinent to what exactly 
this incremental will looks like. Because the emergent state will cause neurons to 
either fire or stop firing in a certain pattern, this will in fact change how they are 
wired together (either strengthen/weaken the connections between them). With a 
different wiring of the neurons that give rise to the emergent effect that we are 
calling consciousness, we can venture to say that this different wiring will give 
rise to a novel emergent state of consciousness. At this point, anyone particularly 
familiar with different types of psychological therapies will notice that this is 
perfectly aligned with Cognitive Behavioral Therapy, a therapy that has been 
used to treat psychological ailments from depression, bipolar disorder, and 
anxiety all the way to PTSD (INSERM). All of this to say, Nietzsche’s view of the 
incremental will not only has moral implications in terms of how we construct 
narratives and thoughts, but also aligns quite well with contemporary 
neuroscientific explanations as to how neurons interact with each other, and 
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even some conceptions of the will (Gazzaniga). With this in mind, we are able to 
enact incremental will on a daily basis in order to offer ourselves a sort of micro-
Cognitive Behavioral Therapy, one which will not necessarily be aimed at curing 
mental ailments, but instead directed at shaping what we deem as the self on a 
incremental basis.  
 Though it is assumed quite often that the realms of neuroscience, 
philosophy, linguistics, and the humanities have only little overlap in areas that 
most see as quite trivial in the big scheme of things, I assert that this analysis 
regarding narrative, incremental will, linguistic constructs, and imperative gives a 
strong counter argument to this notion. For example, if one were to never give a 
philosophical reading to the notion of language as violence, there is the chance 
that they would never give thought to the implications behind the constructs we 
use in terms of the incremental will, and then would never think differently in 
order to be different. The philosophical analysis leads to the linguistic analysis, 
the linguistic analysis leads to the psychological introspection, and finally the 
psychological introspection leads to a change in the neuronal correlates. If we 
can use this example as a sort of groundwork in which supposedly different 
realms can interact in order to create ideas much larger than themselves, then 
and only then can we keep creating cross-field ideas that are relevant to all of 
society. One large question is left: Although we might realize our own 
discordance and work towards a more well informed view of the narratives that 
form our lives, how might we best urge those that are set in their own ways to 
question and prod their own running narratives? How can we lead them to 
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question the meta-narrative(s) that can form all that is below it/them in order to 
maybe urge the realization of the importance of combining all of these fields? 
This question and the urgency that follows from it is exactly where I hope to head 
with further research. While I have a slight idea that the answer lies within the 
exposure of children to dissonance within their earlier years, this thesis is not the 
place to expand on the question, but instead to pose it in order to hopefully 
approach it more deeply in years to follow.  
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A Final Look back 
 At the beginning of this thesis I set out to accomplish four goals: 1) To 
adequately and fairly bring in viewpoints across the spectrums of multiple fields. 
2) To showcase the importance and fruitfulness of bringing in fields that are 
normally seen as dichotomous on the subject at hand. 3) To walk away with not 
an answer, but a more well informed viewpoint on the subject, leaving me more 
conscious of the implications of my actions upon this world. 4) To leave with a 
question worth following up on after the “conclusion” of my thesis. In my eyes, all 
of these goals have been accomplished in multiple ways: Linguists, philosophers, 
psychologists, authors, poets, and neuroscientists have been brought into 
conversation with each other in order to yield not a conclusion, but a more well 
informed and parallel realm of creation in which to ask questions and seek 
answers. I can walk away from this thesis with a more keen awareness in the 
ways in which I utilize language and narratives, all too aware of the implications 
that each have both on my own consciousness and others’ consciousness. With 
this more honed awareness, I am now left able to explore more honestly how I 
ought to convince others of the fruitfulness of welcoming more realms of thought 
into their own, yielding a community that is not only more open to different ideas, 
but also more comprehensive with their own.  
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Figure 1. This figure explores the various ties in relationships and actions that are 
present in Nabokov’s Lolita.  
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